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We consider the problem of learning sparse polymatrix games from observations
of strategic interactions. We show that a polynomial time method based on `1,2-
group regularized logistic regression recovers a game, whose Nash equilibria are the
-Nash equilibria of the game from which the data was generated (true game), in
O (m4d4 log(pd)) samples of strategy profiles — where m is the maximum number
of pure strategies of a player, p is the number of players, and d is the maximum
degree of the game graph. Under slightly more stringent separability conditions on
the payoff matrices of the true game, we show that our method learns a game with
the exact same Nash equilibria as the true game. We also show that Ω (d log(pm))
samples are necessary for any method to consistently recover a game, with the same
Nash-equilibria as the true game, from observations of strategic interactions. We
verify our theoretical results through simulation experiments.
1. Introduction and Related Work
Motivation. Many complex real-world data can be thought of as resulting from the behavior of a
large number of self-interested trying to myopically or locally maximize some utility. Over the past
several decades, non-cooperative game theory has emerged as a powerful mathematical framework
for reasoning about such strategic interactions between self-interested agents. Traditionally,
research in game theory has focused on computing the Nash equilibria (NE) (c.f. Blum et al.
(2006) and Jiang and Leyton-Brown (2011)) — which characterizes the stable outcome of the
overall behavior of self-interested agents — correlated equilibria (c.f. (Kakade et al., 2003)), and
other solution concepts given a description of the game. Computing the price of anarchy (PoA)
for graphical games, which in a sense quantifies the inefficiency of equilibria, is also of tremendous
interest (c.f. (Ben-Zwi and Ronen, 2011)). The aforementioned problems of computing the NE,
correlated equilibria and PoA can be thought of as inference problems in graphical games, and
require a description of the game, i.e., the payoffs of the players. In many real-world settings,
however, only the behavior of the agents are observed, in which case inferring the latent payoffs
of the players from observations of behavioral data becomes imperative. This problem of learning
a game from observations of behavioral data, i.e., recovering the structure and parameters of the
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player payoffs such that the Nash equilibria of the game, in some sense, approximates the Nash
equilibria of the true game, is the primary focus of the paper.
Recovering the underlying game from behavioral data is an important tool in exploratory
research in political science and behavioral economics, and recent times have seen a surge of
interest in such problems (c.f. (Irfan and Ortiz, 2014; Honorio and Ortiz, 2015; Ghoshal and
Honorio, 2016; Garg and Jaakkola, 2016; Ghoshal and Honorio, 2017)). For instance, in political
science, Irfan and Ortiz (2014) identified the most influential senators in the U.S congress —
a small coalition of senators whose collective behavior forced every other senator to a unique
choice of action — by learning a linear influence game from congressional voting records. Garg
and Jaakkola (2016) showed that a tree-structured polymatrix game 1 learned from U.S. Supreme
Court data was able to recover the known ideologies of the justices. However, many open
problems remain in this area of active research. One such problem is whether there exists
efficient (polynomial time) methods for learning polymatrix games (Janovskaja, 1968) from noisy
observations of strategic interactions. This is the focus of the current paper.
Related Work. Various methods have been proposed for learning games from data. Honorio
and Ortiz (2015) proposed a maximum-likelihood approach to learn “linear influence games” — a
class of parametric graphical games with linear payoffs. However, in addition to being exponential
time, the maximum-likelihood approach of Honorio and Ortiz (2015) also assumed a specific
observation model for the strategy profiles. Ghoshal and Honorio (2016) proposed a polynomial
time algorithm, based on `1-regularized logistic regression, for learning linear influence games.
They again assumed the specific observation model proposed by Honorio and Ortiz (2015) in
which the strategy profiles (or joint actions) were drawn from a mixture of uniform distributions:
one over the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set, and the other over the complement of
the PSNE set. Ghoshal and Honorio (2017) obtained necessary and sufficient conditions for
learning linear influence games under arbitrary observation model. Finally, Garg and Jaakkola
(2016) use a discriminative, max-margin based approach, to learn tree structured polymatrix
games. However, their method is exponential time and they show that learning polymatrix
games is NP-hard under this max-margin setting, even when the class of graphs is restricted
to trees. Furthermore, all the aforementioned works, with the exception of Garg and Jaakkola
(2016), consider binary strategies only. In this paper, we propose a polynomial time algorithm
for learning polymatrix games, which are non-parametric graphical games where the pairwise
payoffs between players are characterized by matrices (or pairwise potential functions). In this
setting, each player has a finite number of pure-strategies.
Our Contributions. We propose an `1,2 group-regularized logistic regression method to learn
polymatrix games, which has been considered by Garg and Jaakkola (2016) and is a generalization
of linear influence games considered by Ghoshal and Honorio (2017). We make no assumptions
on the latent payoff functions and show that our polynomial time algorithm recovers an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the true game 2, with high probability, if the number of samples is O (m4d4 log(pd)),
where p is the number of players, d is the maximum degree of the game graph and m is the
maximum number of pure-strategies of a player. Under slightly more stringent separability
conditions on the payoff functions of the underlying game, we show that our method recovers
the Nash equilibria set exactly. We further generalize the observation model from Ghoshal and
1Garg and Jaakkola (2016) call their game a potential game even though the formulation of their game is similar
to ours.
2By the phrase “recovering the Nash equilibria” we mean that we learn a game with the same Nash equilibria as
the true game. We use this phrase elsewhere in the paper for brevity.
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Honorio (2017) in the sense that we allow strategy profiles in the non-Nash equilibria set to have
zero measure. This should be compared with the results of Garg and Jaakkola (2016) who show
that learning tree-structured polymatrix games is NP-hard under a max-margin setting. We also
obtain necessary conditions on learning polymatrix games and show that Ω (d log(pm)) samples
are required by any method for recovering the PSNE set of a polymatrix game from observations
of strategy profiles.
Finally, we conclude this section by referring the reader to the work of Jalali et al. (2011) who
analyze `1,2-regularized logistic regression for learning undirected graphical models. However, our
setting differs from that of learning discrete graphical models in many ways. First, unlike discrete
graphical models, where the underlying distribution over the variables is described by a potential
function that factorizes over the cliques of the graph, we make no assumptions whatsoever on the
generative distribution of data. Further, we are interested in recovering the PSNE set of a game,
since the graph structure in generally unidentifiable from observational data, whereas Jalali et al.
(2011) obtain guarantees on the graph structure of the discrete graphical model. As a result, our
theoretical analysis and proofs differ significantly from those of Jalali et al. (2011).
2. Notation and Problem Formulation
In this section, we introduce our notation and formally define the problem of learning polymatrix
games from behavioral data.
Polymatrix games. A p-player polymatrix game is a graphical game where the set of nodes of
the graph denote players and the edges correspond to two-player games. We will denote the graph
by G = ([p], E), where [p] def= {1, . . . , p} is the vertex set and E ⊆ [p]× [p] is set of directed edges.
An edge (i, j) ∈ E denotes the directed edge i← j. Each player i has a set of pure-strategies or
actions Ai, and the set of pure-strategy profiles or joint actions of all the p players is denoted by
A = ×i∈[p]Ai. We will denote A−i def= ×j∈−iAj . With each edge (i, j) ∈ E is associated a payoff
matrix ui,j : Ai ×Aj → R, such that ui,j(xi, xj) gives the finite payoff of the i-th player (with
respect to the j-th player), when player i plays xi ∈ Ai and player j plays xj ∈ Aj . We assume
that (i, j) ∈ E, if and only if ui,j(·, ·) 6= 0. Given a strategy profile x ∈ A, the total payoff, or
simply the payoff, of the i-th player is given by the following potential function:
ui(xi,x−i;G) = ui,i(xi) +
∑
j∈Ni
ui,j(xi, xj), (1)
where Ni(G) def= {j ∈ [p]|(i, j) ∈ E} is the set of neighbors of i in the graph G, and ui,i : Ai → R
gives the (finite) individual payoff of i for playing xi. We will denote the number of neighbors of
player i by di
def
= |Ni(G)|, and the maximum degree of the graph G by d = max{d1, . . . , dp}. A
polymatrix game G = (G,U) is then completely defined by a graph G = ([p], E) and a collection
of potential functions U(G) = {ui : A−i → R}i∈[p], where each of the payoff functions ui(·;G)
decomposes according to (1). Finally, we will also assume that the number of strategies of each
player, mi
def
= |Ai|, is non-zero and O (1) with respect to p and d, and that m def= max{mi}.
Nash equilibria of polymatrix games. The pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set for the
game G = (G,U) is given by the set of strategy profiles where no player has any incentive to
unilaterally deviate from its strategy given the strategy profiles of its neighbors, and is defined
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as follows:
NE(G) =
{
x ∈ A
∣∣∣ xi ∈ argmax
a∈Ai
ui(a,x−i)
}
. (2)
The set of ε-Nash equilibria of the game G are those strategy profiles where each player can gain
at most ε payoff by deviating from its strategy, and is defined as follows:
ε-NE(G) =
{
x ∈ A | ui(xi,x−i) ≥ ui(a,x−i)− ε,∀a ∈ Ai and ∀i ∈ [p]
}
. (3)
Observation model. Without getting caught up in the dynamics of gameplay — something
that is difficult to observe or reason about in real-world scenarios — we abstract the learning
problem as follows. Assume that we are given “noisy” observations of strategy profiles, or joint
actions, D = {x(l) ∈ A}l∈[n] drawn from a game G = (G,U). The noise process models our
uncertainty over the individual actions of the players due to observation noise, for instance, when
we observe the actions through a noisy channel, or due to the unobserved dynamics of gameplay
during which equilibrium is reached. By “observations drawn from a game” we simply mean that
there exists a distribution P , from which the strategy profiles are drawn, satisfying the following
condition:
∀x,x′ such that x ∈ NE(G) and x′ ∈ A \ NE(G) : P(x) > P(x′).
The above condition ensures that the signal level is more than the noise level. This should
be compared with the observation model of Ghoshal and Honorio (2017), who assume that
∀x′ ∈ A \ NE(G),P(x′) > 0. Our observation model thus encompasses specific observation
models considered in prior literature (Honorio and Ortiz, 2015; Ghoshal and Honorio, 2016):
the global and local noise model. The global noise model is parameterized by a constant
q ∈ (NE(G)/|A|, 1) such that the probability of observing a strategy profile x ∈ A is given by a
mixture of two uniform distributions:
Pg(x;G) = q1 [x ∈ NE(G)]|NE(G)| + (1− q)
1 [x /∈ NE(G)]
|A| − |NE(G)| . (4)
In the local noise model, we observe strategy profiles x from the PSNE set with each entry
(strategy) corrupted independently. Therefore, in the local noise model we have the following
distribution over strategy profiles:
Pl(x;G) = 1|NE(G)| ×
∑
y∈NE(G)
p∏
i=1
(qi)
1[xi=yi]
(
1− qi
mi − 1
)1[xi 6=yi]
, (5)
with qi > 0.5 for all i ∈ [p].
In essence, we assume that we observe multiple “stable outcomes” of the game, which may
or may-not be in equilibria. Treating the outcomes of the game as “samples” observed across
multiple “plays” of the same game is a recurring theme in the literature for learning games (c.f.
(Honorio and Ortiz, 2015), (Ghoshal and Honorio, 2016), (Ghoshal and Honorio, 2017), (Garg
and Jaakkola, 2016)).
The learning problem then corresponds to recovering a game Ĝ = (Ĝ, Û) from D such that
NE(Ĝ) = NE(G) with high probability. Given that computing a single Nash equilibria is PPAD-
complete (Daskalakis et al., 2009), any efficient learning algorithm must learn the game without
explicitly computing or enumerating the Nash equilibria of the game. It has also been shown that
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even computing an ε-Nash equlibria is hard under the exponential time hypothesis for PPAD
(Rubinstein, 2016). We also emphasize that we do not observe any information about the latent
player payoffs, and neither do we impose any restrictions on the payoffs for obtaining our ε-Nash
equilibria guarantees. Also, note that in our definition of the learning problem, we do not impose
any restriction on the “closeness” of the recovered graph Ĝ to the true graph G. This is because
multiple graphs G can give rise to the same PSNE set under different payoff functions and thus
be unidentifiable from observations of joint actions alone (see section 4.4.1 of Honorio and Ortiz
(2015) for a counter example.)
3. Method
In this section, we describe our method for learning polymatrix games from observational data.
The individual and pairwise payoffs can be equivalently written, in linear form, as follows:
ui,i(xi) = (θ
i,0)T f i,0(xi),
ui,j(xi, xj) = (θ
i,j)T f i,j(xi, xj),
where for j ∈ Ni, f i,j(xi, xj) = (1 [xi = a, xj = b])a∈Ai, b∈Aj and θi,j = (θi,ja,b)a∈Ai, b∈Aj , f i,0(xi) =
(1 [xi = a])a∈Ai and θi,0 = (θ
i,0
a )a∈Ai . Note that f i,j ∈ {0, 1}(mimj), θi,j ∈ R(mimj) 6= 0, f i,0(xi) ∈
{0, 1}mi , and θi,0 ∈ Rmi . Let
θi
def
= (θi,0,θi,1, . . . ,θi,i−1,θi,i+1, . . . ,θi,p),
f i(xi,x−i)
def
= (f i,0(xi), f
i,1(xi, x1), . . . , f
i,i−1(xi, xi−1),
f i,i+1(xi, xi+1), . . . , f
i,p(xi, xp)), (6)
with θi,j = 0 for j > 0 ∧ j /∈ Ni, and θi ∈ R(mi+
∑
j∈−imimj), f i(xi,x−i) ∈ {0, 1}(mi+
∑
j∈−imimj).
Thus the payoff for the i-th player can be written, in linear form, as:
ui(xi,x−i) = (θi)T f i(xi,x−i). (7)
The learning problem then corresponds to learning the parameters θi for each player i. The
sparsity pattern of θi identifies the neighbors of i. The way this differs from the binary strategies
considered by Ghoshal and Honorio (2017) is that the parameters θi have a group-sparsity
structure, i.e., for all j > 0∧ j /∈ Ni the entire group of parameters θi,j is zero. In order to ensure
that the payoffs are finite, we will assume that the parameters for the i-th player belong to the
set Θi def= {y ∈ R(mi+
∑
j∈−imimj) | ‖y‖∞ <∞}.
Our approach for estimating the parameters θi is to perform one-versus-rest multinomial
logistic regression with `1,2 group-sparse regularization. In more detail, we obtain estimators θ̂i
by solving the following optimization problem for each i ∈ [p]:
θ̂i = argmin
θ∈Θi
Li(D;θ) + λ‖θ‖1,2, (8)
Li(D;θ) = 1
n
n∑
l=1
`i(x(l);θ), (9)
`i(x;θ) = − log
(
exp(θT f i(xi,x−i))∑
a∈Ai exp(θ
T f i(a,x−i))
)
, (10)
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where ‖θ‖1,2 =
∑
j∈[p]‖θj‖2, with θj being the j-th group of θ. When referring to a block of a
matrix or vector we will use bold letters, e.g, θj denotes the j-th group or block of θ, while θj
denotes the j-th element of θ. In general, we define the `a,b group structured norm as follows:
‖θ‖a,b = ‖(‖θ1‖b, . . . , ‖θp‖b)‖a. Also, when using group structured norms, we will use the group
structure as shown in (6), i.e., we will assume that there are p groups and, in the context of the
i-th player, the sizes of the groups are: {mi,mim1, . . . ,mimi−1,mimi+1, . . . ,mimp}. Finally, we
will define the support set of θi as the set of all indices corresponding to the active groups, i.e.,
Si = {(j, k)|j ∈ {0}∪Ni and k ∈ [mi] for j = 0, k ∈ [mimj ] for j > 0}, where j can be thought
of as indexing the groups, while k can be thought of as the indexing the elements within the j-th
group. Thus, |Si| = mi +
∑
j∈Nimimj .
After estimating the parameters θ̂i for each i ∈ [p], the payoff functions are simply estimated
to be ûi(xi,x−i) = (θ̂i)T f i(xi,x−i). Finally, the graph Ĝ = ([p], Ê) is given by the group-sparsity
structure of ûis, i.e., ûi,j(·, ·) 6= 0 =⇒ (i, j) ∈ Ê.
4. Sufficient Conditions
First, we obtain sufficient conditions on the number of samples n to ensure successful PSNE
recovery. Since our theoretical results depend on certain properties of the Hessian of the loss
function defined above, we introduce the Hessian matrix in this paragraph. Let Hi(x;θ) denote
the Hessian of `i(x;θ). A little calculation shows that the (j, k)-th block of the Hessian matrix
for the i-th player is given as:
Hij,k(x;θ) =
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x−i;θ)f i,j(a, xj)(f i,k(a, xk))T−
{(∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x−i;θ)f i,j(a, xj)
)
×
(∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x−i;θ)f i,k(a, xk)
)T}
, (11)
σi(x,x−i;θ) =
exp(θT f i(x,x−i))∑
a∈Ai exp(θ
T f i(a,x−i))
, (12)
where we have overloaded the notation f i,j(xi, xj) to also include f i,0(xi), i.e., we let f i,0(xi, x0)
def
=
f i,0(xi). We will denote the i-th expected Hessian matrix at any parameter θ ∈ Θi as Hi(θ) =
Ex
[
Hi(x;θ)
]
, and the i-th Hessian matrix at the true parameter θi as Hi(θi). We will also drop
the superscript i from the i-th Hessian matrix, whenever clear from context. We will denote the
finite sample version of Hi(θi) by Hi(D,θi), i.e., Hi(D,θi) = 1n
∑n
l=1 H
i(x(l),θi). Finally, we
will denote the Hessian matrix restricted to the true support set Si by: Hi(·;θiSi) ∈ R|Si|×|Si|.
In order to prove our main result, we will present a series of technical lemmas slowly building
towards our main result. Detailed proofs of the lemmas are given in Appendix A.
The following lemma states that the i-th population Hessian is positive definite. Specifically,
the i-th population Hessian evaluated at the true parameter θi, are positive definite with the
minimum eigenvalue being Cmin. We prove the following lemma by showing that the loss function
given by (10), when restricted to an arbitrary line, is strongly convex as long as the payoffs are
finite.
Lemma 1 (Minimum eigenvalue of population Hessian). For θi ∈ Θi, λmin(Hi(θi)) def= Cmin > 0.
Given that population Hessian matrices are positive-definite, we then show that the finite sample
Hessian matrices, evaluated at any parameter θSi , are positive definite with high probability. We
use tools from random matrix theory developed by (Tropp, 2012) to prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 (Minimum eigenvalue of finite sample Hessian). Let θ ∈ Θi be any arbitrary vector and
let λmin(Hi(θSi))
def
= λmin > 0. Then, if the number of samples satisfies the following condition:
n ≥ 8(di + 1)
λmin
log
(
mi(1 + dim)
δ
)
,
then λmin(Hi(D;θSi)) ≥ λmin2 with probability at least 1− δ for some δ ∈ (0, 1).
Now that we have shown that the loss function given by (10) is strongly convex (Lemmas 1
and 2), we exploit strong convexity to control the difference between the true parameter and
the estimator ‖θi − θ̂i‖1,2. However, before proceeding further, we need to bound the `∞,2 norm
of the gradient, as done in the following lemma. We prove the lemma by using McDiarmid’s
inequality to show that in each group the finite sample gradient concentrates around the expected
gradient, and then use a union bound over all the groups to control the `∞,2 norm.
Lemma 3 (Gradient bound). Let ‖Ex
[∇`i(x;θi)]‖∞,2 = ν, then we have that
‖∇Li(D;θi)‖∞,2 ≤ ν +
√
2
n
log
(2(di + 1)
δ
)
,
with probability at least 1− δ.
Note that the expected gradient at the parameter θi does not vanish, i.e., ‖Ex
[∇`i(x;θi)]‖∞,2 =
ν. This is because of the mismatch between the generating distribution P and the softmax
distribution used for learning the parameters, as in (10). Indeed, if the data were drawn from a
Markov random field, which induces a softmax distribution on the conditional distribution of
node given the rest of the nodes, the parameter ν = 0. However this is not the case for us. An
unfortunate consequence of this is that, even with an infinite number of samples, our method
will not be able to recover the parameters θi exactly. Thus, without additional assumptions on
the payoffs, our method only recovers the ε-Nash equilibrium of the game.
With the required technical results in place, we are now ready to bound ‖θi − θ̂i‖1,2. Our
analysis has two steps. First, we bound the norm in the true support set, i.e., ‖θiSi − θ̂iSi‖1,2.
Then, we show that the norm of the difference between the true parameter and the estimator,
outside the support set, is a constant factor (specifically 3) of the difference in the support set.
For the first step with use a proof technique originally developed by Rothman et al. (2008) in
a different context, while the second step follows from matrix algebra and optimality of the
estimator θ̂i for the problem (8).
The following technical lemma, which will be used later on in our proof to bound ‖θ̂iS − θiS‖1,2,
lower bounds the minimum eigenvalue of the i-th population Hessian at an arbitrary parameter
θ ∈ Θi, in terms of the minimum eigenvalue of the i-th population Hessian at the true parameter
θi.
Lemma 4 (Minimum population eigenvalue at arbitrary parameter). Let θ ∈ Θi be any vector.
Then the minimum eigenvalue of i-th population Hessian matrix evaluated at θSi is lower bounded
as follows:
λmin(H
i(θSi)) ≥ λmin(Hi(θiSi))−
1
4
(di + 1)m
2‖θSi − θiSi‖1,2.
Now, we are ready to bound the difference between the true parameter θi and its estimator θ̂i,
in the true support set Si.
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Lemma 5 (Error of the i-th estimator on the support set). If the regularization parameter and
number of samples satisfy the following condition:
λ ≥ 2
(
ν +
√
2
n
log
(
2(di + 1)
δ
))
,
n >
2
N(m, di)
log
(
2(di + 1)
δ
)
,
where N(m, di) = {Cmin/(36m2(di+1)2)− ν}2, and Cmin def= λmin(Hi(θiSi)); then with probability at
least 1− δ, for some δ ∈ (0, 1), we have:
‖θ̂iSi − θiSi‖1,2 ≤
6(di + 1)
Cmin
λ. (13)
Next, we bound the difference between the true parameter θi and its estimator θ̂i.
Lemma 6 (Error of the i-th parameter estimator). Under the same conditions on the regular-
ization parameter and number of samples as in Lemma 5 we have, with probability at least 1− δ
for some δ ∈ (0, 1),
‖θ̂i − θi‖1,2 ≤ 24(di + 1)
Cmin
λ.
Now that we have control over ‖θi− θ̂i‖1,2 for all i ∈ [p], we are ready to prove our main result
concerning the sufficient number of samples needed by our method to guarantee PSNE recovery
with high probability.
Theorem 1. Let G = (G,U), with U = {ui : A−i → R}i∈[p], be the true potential graphical game
over p players and maximum degree d, from which the data set D is drawn. Let Ĝ = (Ĝ, Û), with
Û = {ûi : A−i → R}i∈[p], be the game learned from the data set D by solving the optimization
problem (8) for each i ∈ [p]. Then if the regularization parameter and the number of samples
satisfy the condition:
λ ≥ 2
(
ν +
√
2
n
log
(
2p(d+ 1)
δ
))
,
n > max
{
2
N(m, d)
log
(
2p(d+ 1)
δ
)
,
8(d+ 1)
Cmin
log
(
m(1 + dm)
δ
)}
,
where N(m, d) = {Cmin/(36m2(d+1)2)− ν}2, then we have that the following hold with probability at
least 1− δ, for some δ ∈ (0, 1):
(i) NE(Ĝ) = ε-NE(G), with ε = 48(di+1)Cmin λ.
(ii) Additionally, if the true game G satisfies the condition: ∀i ∈ [p], ∀(xi,x−i), (x′i,x−i) ∈ A
such that (xi,x−i) ∈ NE(G) ∧ (x′i,x−i) /∈ NE(G) =⇒ ui(xi,x−i) > ui(x′i,x−i) + ε. Then,
NE(Ĝ) = NE(G).
Proof. Note that ‖f i(xi,x−i)‖∞,2 = max{‖f i,0(xi)‖2, ‖f i,1(xi, x1)‖2, . . . , ‖f i,p(xi, xp)‖2} = 1, for
any x ∈ A, since each binary vector f i,j(xi, xj) has a single “1” at exactly one location. Then,
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from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, Lemma 6, and a union bound over all players, we have
that:
(∀x ∈ A, ∀i ∈ [p]) |ûi(xi,x−i)− ui(xi,x−i)| = |(θ̂i − θi)T f i(xi,x−i)|
≤ ‖θ̂i − θi‖1,2‖f i(xi,x−i)‖∞,2
= ‖θ̂i − θi‖1,2 ≤ 24(di + 1)
Cmin
λ =
ε
2
, (14)
with probability at least 1− pδ. Now consider any x ∈ NE(Ĝ) and any i ∈ [p]. Since x ∈ NE(Ĝ),
we have from (14), (∀x′i ∈ Ai):
ui(xi,x−i) + ε/2 ≥ ûi(xi,x−i) ≥ ûi(x′i,x−i)
=⇒ ui(xi,x−i) ≥ ûi(x′i,x−i)− ε/2
=⇒ ui(xi,x−i) ≥ ui(x′i,x−i)− ε,
where the last line again follows from (14). This proves that NE(Ĝ) ⊆ ε-NE(G). Using exactly
the same arguments as above, we can also show that for any x ∈ NE(G):
ûi(xi,x−i) ≥ ûi(xi,x−i)− ε (∀x′i ∈ Ai),
which proves that NE(G) ⊆ ε-NE(Ĝ). Thus we have that NE(Ĝ) = ε-NE(G), i.e., the set of joint
strategy profiles x ∈ NE(Ĝ) form an ε-Nash equilibrium set of the true game G. This proves our
first claim. For our second claim, consider any (xi,x−i) ∈ NE(G) and (x′i,x−i) /∈ NE(G). Then:
ui(xi,x−i) > ui(x′i,x−i) + ε
=⇒ ûi(xi,x−i) + ε/2 > ûi(x′i,x−i)− ε/2 + ε
=⇒ ûi(xi,x−i) > ûi(x′i,x−i)
=⇒ (xi,x−i) ∈ NE(Ĝ) ∧ (x′i,x−i) /∈ NE(Ĝ),
where the first line holds by assumption, and the second line again follows from (14). Thus we
have that NE(G) = NE(Ĝ). By setting the probability of error pδ = δ′ for some δ′ ∈ (0, 1) we
prove our claim. The second part of the lower bound on the number of samples is due to Lemma
2.
Remark 1. The sufficient number of samples needed by our method to guarantee PSNE recovery,
with probability at least 1−δ, scales as O (m4d4 log(pd/δ)). This should be compared with the results
of Jalali et al. (2011) for learning undirected graphical models. They show that O (m2d2 log(m2p))
are sufficient for learning m-ary discrete graphical models. However, their sample complexity
hides a constant K that is related to the maximum eigenvalue of the scatter matrix, which we
have upper bounded by m2d2 in our case, leading to a slightly higher sample complexity.
Remark 2. Note that as n→∞, the regularization parameter λ→ 2ν, where ν is the maximum
norm of the expected gradient at the true parameter θi across all i ∈ [p]. Thus, even with an
infinite number of samples, our method recovers the ε-Nash equlibria set of the true game with
ε→ 96(di+1)νCmin as n→∞.
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Figure 1: Estimated probability of exact recovery of the PSNE set computed across 40
randomly sampled polymatrix games with the number of samples set to n =
10c(d+ 1)2 log(2p(d+1)/δ), where c is the control parameter shown in the x-axis, and
δ = 0.01.
5. Necessary Conditions
In this section, we obtain an information-theoretic lower bound on the number of samples needed
to learn sparse polymatrix games. Let Gp,d,m be set of polymatrix games over p players, with
degree at most d, and maximum number of strategies per player being m. Our approach for
doing so is to treat the inference procedure as a communication channel, where nature picks a
game G∗ from the set Gp,d,m and then generates a data set D of n strategy profiles. A decoder
ψ : An → Gp,d,m then maps D to a game Ĝ ∈ Gp,d,m. We wish to obtain lower bounds on the
number of samples required by any decoder ψ to recover the true game consistently. In this
setting, we define the minimax estimation error as follows:
perr = min
ψ
sup
G∗∈Gp,d,m
Pr {NE(ψ(D)) 6= NE(G∗)} ,
where the probability is computed over the data distribution. For obtaining necessary conditions
on the sample complexity, we assume that the data distribution follows the global noise model
described in (4). The following theorem prescribes the number of samples needed for learning
sparse polymatrix games. Our proof of the theorem constitutes constructing restricted ensembles
of “hard-to-learn” polymatrix games, from which nature picks a game uniformly at random and
generates data. We then use the Fano’s technique to lower bound the minimax error. The
use of restricted ensembles is customary for obtaining information-theoretic lower bounds, c.f.
(Santhanam and Wainwright, 2012; Wang et al., 2010).
Theorem 2. If the number of samples n ≤ log(m
d−m)(pd)
2 log 2 −1, then estimation fails with perr ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Consider the following restricted ensemble G˜ ⊂ Gp,d,m of p-player polymatrix games with
degree d, and the set of pure-strategies of each player being Ai = [m]. Each G = (G,U) ∈ G˜p,d,m
is characterized by a set I of influential players, and a set Ic def= [p] \ I of non-influential players,
with |I| = d. The graph G is a complete (directed) bipartite graph from the set I to Ic. After
picking the graph structure G, nature fixes the strategies of the influential players to some
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a ∈ {b ∈ [m]|I| | ∃i, j ∈ I such that bi 6= bj}. Finally, the payoff matrices are chosen as follows:
ui,i(xi) = 1 [xi = ai] (∀i ∈ I)
uj,j(xj) =
1
(2xj)
(∀j ∈ Ic)
uj,i(xj , xi) = 1 [xj = xi] (∀i ∈ I ∧ j ∈ Ic).
Therefore, each G ∈ G˜ game has a exactly one unique Nash equilibrium where the influential
players play a (decided by nature) and the non-influential players play maj(a) — where maj(a)
returns the majority strategy among a, and in case of a tie between two or more strategies
it returns the numerically lowest strategy (recall that the pure-strategy set for each player is
[m]). Thus we have that |G˜| = (md − m)(pd). Nature picks a game G uniformly at random
from G˜ by randomly selecting a set of d players as “influential”, and then selecting a strategy
profile a uniformly at random for the influential players and setting the payoff matrices as
described earlier. Nature then generates a dataset D using the global noise model with parameter
q ∈ (1/mp, 2/(mp+1)]. Then from the Fano’s inequality we have that:
perr ≥ 1− I(D;G) + log 2
H(G) , (15)
where I(·; ·) and H(·) denote mutual information and entropy respectively. The mutual infor-
mation I(D;G) can be bounded, using a result by Yu (1997), as follows:
I(D;G) ≤ 1
|G˜|2
∑
G1∈G˜
∑
G2∈G˜
KL
(PD|G=G1∥∥PD|G=G2) , (16)
where PD|G=G1 (respectively PD|G=G2) denotes the data distribution under G1 (respectively G2).
The KL divergence term from 16 can be bounded as follows:
KL
(PD|G=G1∥∥PD|G=G2) = n∑
x∈A
PD|G=G1 log
PD|G=G1
PD|G=G2
= n
{ ∑
x∈NE(G1)
q log
q(mp − 1)
1− q +
∑
x∈NE(G2)
(1− q)
mp − 1 log
1− q
q(mp − 1)
}
=
n(qmp − 1)
mp − 1 log
(
q(mp − 1)
1− q
)
≤ n log
(
q(mp − 1)
1− q
)
≤ n log 2, (17)
where the first line follows from the fact that the samples are i.i.d , the second line follows
from the fact the the distributions PD|G=G1 and PD|G=G2 assign the same probability to x ∈
A \ (NE(G1)∪NE(G2)), and the last line follows from the fact that q ∈ (1/mp, 2/(mp+1)]. Putting
together (15), (16) and (17), we have that if
n ≤ log(m
d −m)(pd)
2 log 2
− 1,
then perr ≥ 1/2. Since, learning the ensemble G is at least as hard as learning a subset of G, our
claim follows.
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Remark 3. From the above theorem we have that, the number of samples needed by any conceivable
method, to recover the PSNE set consistently, is Ω (d log(pm)), assuming that d = o(p). Therefore,
the method based on `1,2-regularized logistic regression is information-theoretically optimal in the
number of players, for learning sparse polymatrix games.
6. Experiments
In order to validate our theoretical results, we performed various synthetic experiments by
sampling a random polymatrix game, generating data from the sampled game, and then using
our method to learn the game from the sampled data. We estimated the probability that our
method learns the “correct” game, i.e., a game with the same PSNE set as the true game, across
40 randomly sampled games for each value of p ∈ {7, 11, 15} and d ∈ {1, 3, 5}. The results are
shown in Figure 1. We observe that the scaling of the sample complexity prescribed by Theorem
1 indeed holds in practice. The results show a phase transition behavior, where if the number
of samples is less than c(d + 1)2 log(p(d+1)/δ), for some constant c, then PSNE recovery fails
with high probability, while if the number of samples is at least C(d+ 1)2 log(p(d+1)/δ), for some
constant C, then PSNE recovery succeeds with high probability. More details about our synthetic
experiments can be found in Appendix B.
We also evaluated our algorithm on real-world data sets containing (i) U.S. supreme court
rulings, (ii) U.S. congressional voting records, and (iii) U.N. General Assembly roll-call votes.
Our algorithm recovers connected components corresponding to liberal and conservative blocs
of justices within the Supreme Court of the U.S. The Nash equilibria consists of strategy profiles
where all justices vote unanimously, as well as strategy profiles where the conservative and liberal
blocs vote unanimously but in opposition to each other.
The game graph recovered from congressional voting records, groups Democrats and Repub-
licans in separate components. Moreover, we observed that the connected components groups
senators belonging to the same state or geographic region together. The recovered PSNE set
sheds light on the voting patterns of senators — senators belonging to the same connected
component vote (almost) identically on bills.
Finally, on the U.N. voting data set our method recovered connected components comprising
of Arab League countries and Southeast Asian countries respectively. As was the case with the
aforementioned data sets, the PSNE set grouped countries that vote almost identically on U.N.
resolutions.
We were also able to compute the price of anarchy (PoA) for each data set, which quantifies
the degradation of performance caused by selfish behavior of non-cooperative agents. For the
two supreme court voting data sets, the PoA was 1.9 and 1.6 respectively. For the congressional
voting data set the PoA was 2.6, while for the united nations voting data set the PoA was 3.0.
More details and results from our real-world experiments can be found in Appendix C.
Concluding Remarks. We conclude this exposition with a discussion of potential avenues for
future work. In this paper we considered the problem of learning a very general, and widely used,
class of graphical games called polymatrix games, involving players with pure strategies. One
can also consider mixed strategies, which would entail learning distributions, instead of “sets”,
under the framework of non-cooperative maximization of utility. Further, one can also consider
other solution concepts like correlated equilibria.
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Appendix A Detailed Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 (Minimum eigenvalue of population Hessian).
Fix any θ0,θ1 ∈ Θi, with θ1 6= 0. For any t ∈ (−∞,∞), let F (t;xi) def= (θ0 + tθ1)T f(xi,x−i).
Then for x ∈ A,
`(x;θ0 + tθ1) = −F (t;xi) + log(
∑
a∈Ai
exp(F (t; a))). (18)
A little calculation shows that the double derivative of `(x;θ0 + tθ1) with respect to t is as
follows:
∂2 `(x;θ0 + tθ1)
∂t2
=
∑
a∈Ai
σ(t; a)F ′(a)2 −
(∑
a∈Ai
σ(t; a)F ′(a)
)2
, (19)
σ(t; b) =
exp(F (t; b))∑
a∈Ai exp(F (t; a))
, (b ∈ Ai)
where F ′(a) is the derivative of F (t; a) with respect to t. Since F (t; a) is a linear function of t,
F ′(a) is not a function of t. Also note that
∑
a∈Ai σ(t; a) = 1. Since θ
0,θ1 have bounded norm
and t ∈ (−∞,∞), we have that σ(t; a) > 0, ∀a ∈ Ai. Therefore, from (19), the strict convexity
of (·)2 and Jensen’s inequality, we have:
∂2 `(x;θ0 + tθ1)
∂t2
> 0 (∀t ∈ (−∞,∞)).
Thus we have that `(x,θ) is strongly convex, i.e., λmin(Hi(x;θ)) > 0, ∀θ ∈ Θi. Finally, by
concavity of λmin(·) (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004) and the Jensen’s inequality we have:
λmin(H
i(θi)) = λmin(Ex
[
Hi(x;θi)
]
) ≥ Ex
[
λmin(H
i(x;θi))
]
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 (Minimum eigenvalue of finite sample Hessian).
To simply notation in the proof we will denote Si by S. The (j, k) block of H(D;θS), where
j, k ∈ {0}∪Ni, can be written as:
Hj,k(D;θS) =
n∑
l=1
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x
(l)
−i;θS)f
i,j(a, x
(l)
j )(f
i,k(a, x
(l)
k ))
T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bj,k(D;θS)
−
n∑
l=1
∑
a,b∈Ai
σi(a,x
(l)
−i;θS)f
i,j(a, x
(l)
j )f
i,k(b, x
(l)
k )
T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rj,k(D;θS)
,
where the matrices B and R have been defined above (blockwise). Since the matrix R is positive
semi-definite λmax(H(D;θS)) ≤ λmax(B(D;θS)). Further, since B is positive semi-definite, we
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have, from Lemma 7:
λmax(B(D;θS)) ≤
∑
j∈{0}∪Ni
λmax(Bj,j(D;θS))
≤ (di + 1) max
j∈{0}∪Ni
λmax
( 1
n
n∑
l=1
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x
(l)
−i;θS)f
i,j(a, x
(l)
j )(f
i,j(a, x
(l)
j ))
T
)
≤ (di + 1)
n
max
j∈{0}∪Ni
n∑
l=1
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x
(l)
−i;θS)λmax
(
f i,j(a, x
(l)
j )(f
i,j(a, x
(l)
j ))
T
)
= di + 1.
Thus we have that λmax(H(D;θS)) ≤ λmax(B(D;θS)) ≤ di + 1 def= R. Also note that H(D;θS) ∈
R|S|×|S|, with |S| ≤ mi(1 + dim). Then using the matrix Chernoff bounds by Tropp (2012), we
have:
Pr {λmin(H(D;θS)) ≤ (1− δ)λmin} ≤ |S|
(
exp(−δ)
(1− δ)(1−δ)
)(nλmin/R)
Setting δ = 1/2 we get:
Pr
{
λmin(H(D;θS)) ≥ λmin
2
}
≥ 1−mi(1 + dim) exp
(
− nλmin
8(di + 1)
)
Controlling the probability of error to be at most δ we obtain the lower bound on the number of
samples.
Proof of Lemma 3 (Gradient bound).
A simple calculation shows that
∂ `i(x;θi)
∂θi,j
= −f i,j(xi, xj) +
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x−i;θi)f i,j(a, xj), (20)
where σi(·) has been defined in (12). Let g(x(1), . . . ,x(n)) = (gj(x(1), . . . ,x(n)))j∈{0}∪Ni ,
where gj(·) = ‖ 1n
∑n
l=1
∂ `i(x(l);θi)
∂θi,j
‖2. Then ‖g(·)‖∞ = ‖∇Li(D;θi)‖∞,2 and ‖Ex [g(·)]‖∞ =
‖Ex
[∇`i(x;θi)]‖∞,2 = ν. Then, for any x(l) 6= x(l)′ we have that:
|gj(x(1), . . . ,x(l), . . . ,x(n))− gj(x(1), . . . ,x(l)′ , . . . , gj(x(n))|
=
1
n
∥∥∥∥∥∥f i,j(x(l)′i , x(l)′j )− f i,j(x(l)i , x(l)j ) +
∑
a∈Ai
σi(a,x
(l)
−i;θ
i)f i,j(a, x
(l)
j )− σi(a,x(l)
′
−i ;θ
i)f i,j(a, x
(l)′
j )
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
n
(
2 +
∑
a∈Ai
(σi(a,x
(l)
−i;θ
i))2 + (σi(a,x
(l)′
−i ;θ
i))2
)1/2 ≤ 1
n
(2 + 2)
1/2 = 2/n,
where in the last line we used the fact that
∑
a σ
i(a, ·) = 1 along with the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality. Then using the McDiarmid’s inequality we have:
Pr {|gj(·)− Ex [gj(·)]| ≤ t} ≥ 1− 2 exp
(−nt2
2
)
.
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Then using a union bound over all j we have:
Pr
{
max
j
|gj(·)− Ex [gj(·)]| ≤ t
}
≥ 1− 2(di + 1) exp
(−nt2
2
)
=⇒ Pr {‖g(·)− Ex [g(·)]‖∞ ≤ t} ≥ 1− 2(di + 1) exp
(−nt2
2
)
=⇒ Pr {‖g(·)‖∞ − ‖Ex [g(·)]‖∞ ≤ t} ≥ 1− 2(di + 1) exp
(−nt2
2
)
=⇒ Pr {‖g(·)‖∞ ≤ ν + t} ≥ 1− 2(di + 1) exp
(−nt2
2
)
,
where in the third line we used the reverse triangle inequality. Setting the probability of error to
be δ and solving for t, we prove our claim.
Proof of Lemma 4 (Minimum population eigenvalue at arbitrary parameter).
To simply notation in the proof we will denote Si by S. The population Hessian matrix at H(θS)
can also be written as H(θiS + ∆S), where ∆S = θS − θiS . Using the variational characterization
of the minimum eigenvalue of H(θiS + ∆S) and the Taylor’s theorem, we have:
λmin(H(θ
i
S + ∆S)) = min{y∈R|S||‖y‖2=1}
∑
i,j∈S
yi{Hi,j(θiS) + (∇Hi,j(θ¯S))T∆S}yj
≥ λmin(H(θiS))− max{y∈R|S||‖y‖2=1}
∑
i,j∈S
yi{(∇Hi,j(θ¯S))T∆S}yj
≥ λmin(H(θiS))− max{y∈R|S||‖y‖2=1}
∑
i,j∈S
yi{|(∇Hi,j(θ¯S))T∆S |}yj , (21)
where θ¯ = tθiS + (1− t)θS for some t ∈ [0, 1], and the third line follows from the monotonicity
property of the spectral norm |||·|||2 (Johnson and Nylen, 1991). For any vector θ ∈ Θi, let
A(θS) = (Ai,j(θS)), where Ai,j(θS) = |(∇Hi,j(θS))T∆S |. Then,
|||A(θS)|||2 = |||Ex [A(x;θS)]|||2 ≤ max
x∈A
|||A(x;θS)|||2. (22)
Now consider the (j, k) block of A(x;θS) for any x ∈ A, where j, k ∈ {0}∪Ni. Then, from (11)
we have that:
Aj,k(x;θ) =
∑
a∈Ai
|(∇σi(a,x−i;θ))T∆S |f i,j(a, xj)(f i,k(a, xk))T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bj,k(x;θ)
−
∑
a,b∈Ai
|{σi(b,x−i;θ)∇σi(a,x−i;θ) + σi(a,x−i;θ)∇σi(b,x−i;θ)}T∆S |f i,j(a, xj)f i,k(a, xk)T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rj,k(x;θ)
.
Thus, A(x;θ) = B(x;θ)−R(x;θ), where the matrices B and R have been defined above (block-
wise). Observe that the matrix R is positive semi-definite. Therefore, |||A(x;θ)|||2 ≤ |||B(x;θ)|||2.
Finally, since B is positive semi-definite, the spectral norm of B is at most the sum of the spectral
norms of the diagonal blocks (c.f. Lemma 7). Therefore, we have
|||B(x;θ)|||2 ≤
∑
j∈{0}∪Ni
|||Bj,j(x;θ)|||2 ≤ (di + 1)
(
max
j∈{0}∪Ni
|||Bj,j(x;θ)|||2
)
. (23)
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A little calculation shows that
∂ σi(a,x−i;θ)
∂θj
= σi(a,x−i;θ)
{
f i,j(a, xj)−
∑
a′∈Ai
σi(a′,x−i;θ)f i,j(a′, xj)
}
,
and ‖∂ σi(a,x−i;θ)/∂θj‖∞ ≤ 1/4. Further, since for any given a ∈ Ai, at most mj + 1 elements
of the partial derivative vector above is non-zero, we have ‖∂ σi(a,x−i;θ)/∂θj‖2 ≤ (mj+1)/4 and
‖∇σi(a,x−i;θ)‖∞,2 ≤ (mj+1)/4 ≤ (m+1)/4. Then using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the
monotonicity property of spectral norm (Johnson and Nylen, 1991) we have:
|||Bj,j(x;θ)|||2 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈Ai
‖∇σi(a,x−i;θ))‖∞,2‖∆S‖1,2f i,j(a, xj)(f i,j(a, xj))T
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 1
4
mim‖∆S‖1,2 (24)
Putting together (21), (22), (23) and (24) we get
λmin(H(θ
i
S + ∆S)) ≥ λmin(H(θiS))− |||A(θS)|||2
≥ λmin(H(θiS))− (di + 1)
(
max
x∈A
max
j∈{0}∪Ni
|||Bj,j(x;θ)|||2
)
≥ λmin(H(θiS))−
1
4
(di + 1)mim‖∆S‖1,2.
Proof of Lemma 5 (Error of the i-th estimator on the support set).
To simplify notation in the proof, we will write S instead of Si. Recall that Li(D;θ) is the
empirical loss for the i-th player for parameter θ. For the purpose of the proof we will often write
L(θ) instead of Li(D;θ). Let F (θ) = L(θ) + λ‖θ‖1,2. For any θ ∈ Θi, let ∆S = θS − θiS denote
the difference between θ and the true parameter θi on the true support set S. We introduce the
following shifted and reparameterized regularized loss function:
F˜ (∆S) = L(θ
i
S + ∆S)− L(θiS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 1
+λ(‖θiS + ∆S‖1,2 − ‖θiS‖1,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 2
, (25)
which takes the value 0 at the true parameter θi, i.e., F˜ (0) = 0. Let ∆̂S = θ̂iS − θiS , where
θ̂i minimizes F (θ). Since θ̂i minimizes F (θ), we must have that F˜ (∆̂S) ≤ 0. Thus, in order
to upper bound ‖∆̂S‖1,2 = ‖θ̂S − θiS‖1,2 ≤ b, we show that there exists an `1,2 ball of radius b
such that function F˜ (∆S) is strictly positive on the surface of the ball. To see this, assume the
contrary, i.e, ∀∆ ∈ Θi ∧‖∆S‖1,2 = b, F˜ (∆S) > 0, but ∆̂S lies outside the ball, i.e., ‖∆̂S‖1,2 > b.
Then, there exists a t ∈ (0, 1) such that (1 − t)0 + t∆̂S lies on the surface of the ball, i.e.,
‖(1− t)0 + t∆̂S‖1,2 = b. However, by convexity of F˜ we have that
0 < F˜ ((1− t)0 + t∆̂S) ≤ (1− t)F˜ (0) + tF˜ (∆̂S) = tF˜ (∆̂S),
which implies that F˜ (∆̂S) > 0 and therefore is a contradiction to the fact that F˜ (∆̂S) ≤ 0.
Going forward, our strategy would be to lower bound F˜ (∆S) in terms of ‖∆S‖1,2 = b. We then
set the lower bound to 0 and solve for b, to obtain the radius of the `1,2 ball on which the function
is non-negative. Towards that end we first lower bound the first term of (25).
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Using the Taylor’s theorem and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, for some t ∈ [0, 1], we have:
L(θiS + ∆S)− L(θiS)
= ∇L(θiS)T∆S + ∆TS∇2L(θiS + t∆S)∆S ,
≥ −‖∇L(θiS)‖∞,2‖∆S‖1,2 + ‖∆S‖22λmin(H(D;θiS + t∆S))
≥ −bλ
2
+
‖∆S‖21,2
di + 1
λmin(H(D;θiS + t∆S))
≥ −bλ
2
+
b2
2(di + 1)
(
Cmin − m
2b(di + 1)
4
)
≥ −bλ
2
+
b2Cmin
4(di + 1)
, (26)
where the third follows from our assumption that ‖∇L(θi)‖∞,2 ≤ λ/2 and the fact for any vector x,
‖x‖2 ≥ (1/√g)‖x‖1,2 where the `1,2 norm is evaluated over g groups. The fourth line follows from
Lemma 4 with t = 1 and Lemma 2. Finally, in the last line we assumed that b ≤ 2Cmin/(m2(di+1))
— an assumption that we will verify momentarily. The second term of (25) is easily lower bounded
using the reverse triangle inequality as follows:
λ(‖θiS + ∆S‖1,2 − ‖θiS‖1,2) ≥ −λ‖∆S‖1,2 = −bλ (27)
Putting together (25), (26) and (27) we get:
F˜ (∆S) ≥ −bλ
2
+
b2Cmin
4(di + 1)
− bλ.
Setting the above to zero and solving for b we get:
b =
6λ(di + 1)
Cmin
.
Finally, coming back to our assumption that b ≤ 2Cmin/(m2(di+1)), it is easy to show that the
assumption holds if the regularization parameter λ satisfies:
λ ≤ C
2
min
3m2(di + 1)2
,
The lower bound on the number of samples is obtained by ensuring that the lower bound on λ is
less than the upper bound. The final claim follows from using the high probability bound on
‖∇L(θi)‖∞,2 from Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 6 (Error of the i-th parameter estimator).
∆
def
= θ̂i − θi. We will denote the true support of θi by S, and the complement of S by Sc. We
will also simply write L(θ) instead of Li(D;θ). For any vector y, let yS¯ denote the vector y with
elements not in the support set S zeroed out, i.e.,
(yS¯)j =
{
yj j ∈ S,
0 otherwise
Then by definition of S, we have that ‖θi
S¯
‖1,2 = ‖θi‖1,2.
‖θ̂i‖1,2 = ‖θi + ∆‖1,2 = ‖θiS¯ + ∆S¯ + ∆S¯c‖1,2
= ‖θiS¯ + ∆S¯‖1,2 + ‖∆S¯c‖1,2
≥ ‖θiS¯‖1,2 − ‖∆S¯‖1,2 + ‖∆S¯c‖1,2,
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where in the second line follows from the fact that the index sets S and Sc have non-overlapping
groups, and in the last line we used the reverse triangle inequality. Rearranging the terms of the
previous equation, and from the fact that ‖θi
S¯
‖1,2 = ‖θi‖1,2, we get:
‖θi‖1,2 − ‖θ̂i‖1,2 ≤ ‖∆S¯‖1,2 − ‖∆S¯c‖1,2 (28)
Next, by optimality of θ̂i we have that L(θi) + λ‖θi‖1,2 ≥ L(θ̂i) + λ‖θ̂i‖1,2. Rearranging the
terms and continuing, we get
λ(‖θi‖1,2 − ‖θ̂i‖1,2) ≥ L(θ̂i)− L(θi)
≥ (∇L(θ̂i))T (θ̂i − θi)
≥ −‖∇L(θ̂i))T ‖∞,2‖∆‖1,2
≥ −λ
2
‖∆‖1,2, (29)
where the third line follows from the convexity of L(·), the fourth line follows from the Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality and the last line follows from our assumption that λ ≥ 2‖∇L(θi)‖∞,2. Thus,
from (28) and (29) we have that
1
2
‖∆‖1,2 ≥ ‖∆S¯c‖1,2 − ‖∆S¯‖1,2
=⇒ 1
2
‖∆S¯‖1,2 +
1
2
‖∆S¯c‖1,2 ≥ ‖∆S¯c‖1,2 − ‖∆S¯‖1,2
=⇒ 3‖∆S¯‖1,2 ≥ ‖∆S¯c‖1,2.
Finally, from the above inequality, we have ‖∆‖1,2 = ‖∆S¯‖1,2 + ‖∆S¯c‖1,2 ≤ 4‖∆S‖1,2. The final
result follows from the upper bound on ‖∆S‖1,2 derived in Lemma 5.
Lemma 7 (Maximum eigenvalue of block positive semi-definite matrix). Let X ∈ Rn×n  0 be
any positive semi-definite matrix, with Xi,i being the i-th diagonal block of X. Then
λmax(X) ≤
∑
i
λmax(Xi,i)
Proof. We will prove the result by decomposing X into two blocks as follows:
X =
[
X1,1 X1,2
X2,1 X2,2
]
,
where X1,1 ∈ Rn1×n1 , X2,2 ∈ Rn2×n2 and n1 + n2 = 1. The general result for multiple diagonal
blocks is obtained by recursively decomposing the blocks X1,1 and X2,2. Any unit vector x
can be written as x = c1(x)x1(x) + c2(x)x2(x), with x1(x) = (x1/‖x1(x)‖2, . . . , xn1/‖x1(x)‖2,0),
x2(x) = (0, xn2/‖x2(x)‖2, . . . , xn/‖x2(x)‖2), and c1(x) = ‖x1(x)‖2 (similarly c2(x)). For notational
simplicity we will drop the (x)s. Note that c21 + c22 = 1, thus c = (c1, c2) is also a unit vector.
Further, for any unit vector x, we have xTXx = cTYc, where
Y =
[
xT1 Xx1 x
T
1 Xx2
xT2 Xx1 x
T
2 Xx2
]
∈ R2×2.
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Note that xT1 Xx1 ≤ λmax(X1,1) and xT2 Xx2 ≤ λmax(X2,2) for all x. Thus, using the variational
characterization of the maximum eigenvalue of X we get:
λmax(X) = max‖x‖2=1
xTXx
= max
{c=(‖x1(x)‖2,‖x2(x)‖2) : ‖x‖2=1}
cTYc
≤ max
‖c‖2=1
cTYc = λmax(Y) ≤ Tr (Y) (since Y is positive semi-definite)
≤ λmax(X1,1) + λmax(X2,2),
where the third line follows from the fact that the maximization is over a superset of the set
{c = (‖x1(x)‖2, ‖x2(x)‖2) : ‖x‖2 = 1}.
Appendix B Details of Synthetic Experiments
We generated random polymatrix games G by first generating random graphs over p players with
degree exactly d, and number of pure strategies m = 3 per player. For each edge (i, j) in the
graph, we set the payoffs as follows:
ui,i(a) = 0 (∀a ∈ [3])
ui,j(a, b) ∼ N (0, 2) (∀a ∈ [2] ∧ b ∈ [3])
ui,j(3, b) = 0 (∀b ∈ [3])
We then generated a data set D from the game using the local noise model (5), with the noise
parameter qi = 0.6 for all i ∈ [p]. We then used our method to learn a game Ĝ from the data
set D, and computed 1
[
NE(Ĝ) = NE(G)
]
. We then estimated the probability of successful
PSNE recovery, Pr
{
NE(Ĝ) = NE(G)
}
, across 40 randomly sampled polymatrix games. Figure
1 plots the probability of successful PSNE recovery as the number of samples is varied as
n = 10c(d + 1)2 log(2p(d+1)/δ) and for various values of d ∈ {1, 3, 5}, with c being the control
parameter and δ = 0.01.
Appendix C Experiments on real-world data
We validated our method on three publicly available real-world data sets containing (a) U.S.
supreme court justices rulings, (b) voting records of senators from the 114th U.S. congress, and
(c) roll-call votes in the U.N. General Assembly. We present evaluations of our method for each
of the data set below.
C.1 Supreme court voting records
We analyzed two data sets of supreme court rulings: the first data set contains rulings of 9
justices across 512 cases spanning years 2010 to 2014, while the second data set contains rulings
of 8 justices across 75 cases from year 2015 onwards 3. We pre-processed the data, according the
available code book, to map the vote of each justice, which was originally an integer between 1
to 8, to an integer between 1 to 3. Votes {1, 3, 4, 5} were mapped to 1 and was interpreted as
3All the data sets are publicly available at http://scdb.wustl.edu.
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“voting with majority”, votes {6, 7, 8} were mapped to 2 and was interpreted as “not participating
in the decision” , while vote 3 was mapped to 2 and was interpreted as “dissent”. Thus, after
pre-processing, each justice’s vote was an integer between 1 to 3, with 1 corresponding to majority,
2 corresponding to abstention, and 3 corresponding to dissent.
After pre-processing the data, we learned a polymatrix game over supreme court justices
using our algorithm. The regularization parameter λ was set according to Theorem 1 with
reasonable values for different unknown population parameters. A more principled way to chose
the regularization parameter λ is to assume a specific observation model, for instance, the global
or local noise model, and then using crossvalidation to maximize the log-likelihood. The game
graphs are shown in Figure 2 and the PSNE sets are shown in Table 1 for the two supreme court
rulings data sets (years 2010-2014 and year 2015 onwards).
From 2 it is clear that our method recovers the well-established ideologies of the supreme court
justices. This is especially evident for the graph learned from the first data set — there are two
strongly connected components corresponding to the conservative and liberal bloc within the
supreme court. The PSNE set recovered by our algorithm is also quite revealing. In both the
data sets, a unanimous vote of 1 is a Nash equilibrium. Justice Kennedy, who has a moderate
jurisprudence, always votes with the majority in the PSNE set. Further, strategy profiles where
the conservative blocs and liberal blocs vote unanimously but dissent against each other are also
in the PSNE set. In the second data set, there is a strongly connected component between the
justice Kagan, Kennedy, and Breyer — this also bears out in the corresponding PSNE set where
the strategies of the three justices are identical.
To compute the price of anarchy (PoA), we shifted all the payoff matrices by a constant to
make the payoffs non-negative. Note that this does not change the PSNE set of the game. The
price of anarchy was computed to be the ratio between the maximum welfare across all strategy
profiles and the minimum welfare across all strategy profiles in the PSNE set. The PoA for the
two data sets were, respectively, 1.9104 and 1.6115.
Roberts
Scalia
Kennedy
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer
Alito
Sotomayor
Kagan Roberts
Kennedy
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer
Alito
Sotomayor
Kagan
Figure 2: The graphical game recovered from supreme court rulings data set 1 (years 2010-2014)
on the left, and data set 2 (year 2015 onwards) on the right. Justice Thomas, Scalia,
Roberts and Alito are widely known to be conservative and are denoted by the color
| | , while Justice Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor and Ginsburg, who are known to have
a more liberal jurisprudence, are denoted by color | | . Justice Kennedy, who has
a reputation of being moderate, is denoted by the color | | . The game graph was
generated by adding all edges (i, j) if the corresponding payoff matrix ui,j was not all
zeros. The average “influence” from j to i was calculated as the mean absolute payoff,
i.e., 16
∑3
a=2
∑3
b=1|ui,j(a, b)|. The thickness of the edge denotes this influence of player
j on i. Only the top 50% of the edges, in terms of influence, are shown.
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|Thomas| |Scalia| |Alito| |Roberts| |Kennedy| |Breyer| |Kagan| |Ginsburg| |Sotomayor|
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3
|Thomas| |Alito| |Roberts| |Kennedy| |Breyer| |Kagan| |Ginsburg| |Sotomayor|
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3
Table 1: The PSNE set learned from supreme court rulings data sets 1704 (top) and 1705
(bottom) respectively. Colors represent |conservative| , |liberal| , and |neutral|
justices respectively. The price of anarchy for the two data sets was computed to be 1.9
and 1.6 respectively.
C.2 Senate voting records
We analyzed U.S. congressional voting records for the second session of the 114th congress
(January 4, 2016 to January 3, 2017) 4. The data set comprised of the votes of 100 senators on
63 bills. The votes were pre-processed to take one of the three values: 1 (“yes”), 2 (“abstention”),
and 3 (“no”). After pre-processing the data set we ran our algorithm to recover a polymatrix
game from congressional voting records. Figure 3 shows the recovered game graph. Once again
our method recovers the connected components corresponding the republicans and democrats.
Interestingly, the connected components also have a nice geographic interpretation, for instance,
the graph groups senators from Idaho, New Mexico, New York and midwestern states in their
respective connected components. Strategy profiles where the overwhelming majority of senators
in a connected component vote “yes” are in equilibria.
|Baldwin| |Bennet| |Blumenthal| |Cardin| |Casey| |Coons| |Feinstein| |King| |Klobuchar| |Peters| |Shaheen| |Stabenow|
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
|Cochran| |Roberts| |Rounds| |Wicker|
1 1 1 1
|Fischer| |Hoeven| |Moran| |Thune|
1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3
|Hirono| |Reed| |Schumer| |Whitehouse|
1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3
|Blunt| |Boozman| |Burr| |Capito| |Cassidy| |Coats| |Corker| |Cornyn| |Daines| |Ernst| |Grassley| |Hatch| |Isakson| |McCain| |McConnell| |Portman| |Tillis|
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1
3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 3
Table 2: The PSNE set for the major connected components in the game graph learned from
congressional voting records. The combined number of Nash equilibria computed across
senators with degree at least 1 was 144 and the price of anarchy was computed to be
2.6297.
C.3 United Nations voting data
In our final real-world experiment we analyzed roll-call votes in the U.N. General Assembly. The
4The data set is publicly available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/votes.htm
23
Baldwin
Barrasso
Bennet
Blumenthal
Blunt
Boozman
Burr
Cantwell
Capito
Cardin Casey
Cassidy
Coats
Cochran
Coons
Corker
Cornyn
Crapo
Daines
Enzi
Ernst
FeinsteinFischer
Grassley Hatch
Heinrich
Hirono
Hoeven
Isakson
King
Klobuchar
McCain
McConnell
Moran
Murphy
Murray
Peters
Portman
Reed
Risch
Roberts
Rounds
Schatz
Schumer
Shaheen
Stabenow
Thune
Tillis
Udall
Whitehouse
Wicker
WI
WY
CO
CT
MO
AR
NC
WA
WV
MD PA
LA
IN
MS
DE
TN
TX
ID
MT
WY
IA
CANE
IA UT
NM
HI
ND
GA
ME
MN
AZ
KY
KS
CT
WA
MI
OH
RI
ID
KS
SD
HI
NY
NH
MI
SD
NC
NM
RI
MS
Figure 3: The game graph learned from 114th U.S. congressional voting records. Only nodes
with degree greater than one are shown. Colors represent the following: |Democrat| ,
|Republican| , |Independent| . The graph on the right shows the states that the
senators belong to. The thickness of the edges denote the amount of influence, computed
as the mean absolute payoff, between the senators. Only nodes with degree at least 1
are shown.
data set contained votes of 193 countries for 847 U.N. resolutions 5. Each vote could take one of
the three values in {1, 2, 3}, with 1 denoting “yes”, 2 denoting “abstention”, and 3 denoting “no”.
The game graph learned from the data set is shown in Figure 4 while the PSNE set is shown in
Table 3. As evident from Figure 4 our method recovered two major connected components: the
first consisting of members of the Arab League, and the second consisting of majorly Southeast
Asian countries and a few other Caribbean islands. The PSNE set once again comprised of
strategy profiles where the overwhelming members of a connected component voted “yes”. Within
the component corresponding to the Arab league, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., and Bahrain made up a
small coalition of countries that voted identically in the PSNE set.
Algeria Bahrain Djibouti Egypt Jordan Kuwait Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Sudan Tunisia UAE Yemen
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
Barbados Bangladesh Brunei Cambodia Eritrea Guyana Indonesia Jamaica Malaysia Mali Philippines Senegal Singapore Sri Lanka Thailand Togo Zambia
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Table 3: The PSNE set for the two major connected components in the game graph learned from
United Nations voting data set. The total number of PSNE was 24 and the price of
anarchy was computed to be 3.07.
5 The data set can be downloaded from https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:
1902.1/12379.
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Figure 4: The game graph learned from United Nations voting data set. Nodes belonging to the
same connected component have the same color. Only countries with degree at least 1
are shown.
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